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In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of information leakage on the incentives to in-
novate in ﬁrms. We analyze a situation in which an employee in a ﬁrm is inspired
with a new idea for a product. In a framework in which Intellectual Property Rights
on ideas are absent, we analyze the employee’s decision of whether to disclose the
idea within the ﬁrm or to form a spin-out. We next look at the shareholders of the
original ﬁrm and analyze their incentives to promote creativity and innovations
among employees. Our analysis highlights the eﬀects of the distribution of shares
within the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm’s size on the incentives and behavior of ﬁrms towards
innovation. In particular we highlight the following ﬁndings: (i) Often employees
may not implement an idea neither within nor outside the ﬁrm. (ii) The own-
ership structure aﬀects the incentives to promote innovation in ﬁrms. (iii) Firm
shareholders may have incentives to curtail innovation even if these innovations are
expected to be revealed within the ﬁrm. (iv) Firms may buy-oﬀ potential inno-
vative agents, by providing them with compensation plans that dominate leaving
the ﬁrm, or revealing new ideas within the ﬁrm. (v) Information leakage concerns
aﬀect both the hiring and the information provision decisions of the ﬁrm.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of spin-out ﬁrms is well documented in both the popular press
and the academic literature. Although spin-outs have been forming as early as
ﬁrms existed, spin-out ﬁrms in the high-tech industry have received special atten-
tion. The labor mobility that is prompted by the formation of spin-outs has been
recognized by some (see Saxenian (1994)) to be the engine behind information
diﬀusion, incremental research and the growth of industries.
A big portion of the innovation in the high-tech industry occurs through the
formation of spin-outs (see Christensen (1997)), often implying substantial losses
for their maternal ﬁrms.1 A tt h es a m et i m e ,i n n o v a t i o nt e n d st os t a g n a t ei ne s -
tablished ﬁrms.2 This phenomenon has been termed ‘The Curse of Incumbency’;
existing market leaders are typically slower than entrants to see and adopt new
technologies. As a result, technological change often enables challengers to enter a
market and displace its leaders.
The ‘gales of creative destruction’ pose a problem to existing ﬁrms. Firms
anticipate the potential defection of their most creative members. As this defection
leads to the depletion of the intellectual capital developed within the ﬁrm and to
the loss of substantial rents due to an increased market competition, the incentives
of ﬁrms to promote innovation may be low. In this paper we develop a theoretical
framework to analyze the promotion of cumulative research and innovation in ﬁrms.
To understand the phenomena mentioned above, it is necessary to understand
the decision of innovators to introduce new ideas either within or outside their
maternal ﬁrms. Consider an employee working for a ﬁrm who has an idea for a
new product. In the absence of perfect intellectual property rights, as soon as the
employee discloses his idea to someone (within or outside the ﬁrm), the information
starts leaking and he looses control of his innovation. All the agents who become
aware of the idea can start negotiating on the proﬁts that are expected to be realized
on the market once the idea is implemented. The renegotiation can involve both
people people from within or outside the ﬁrm. To pin down the appropriation rates
that innovators can expect under the diﬀerent scenarios, it is necessary to take into
account the fact that the outcome of the negotiation is aﬀected by the number of
people that become aware of the new idea and by the patterns of the information
1In fact this phenomenon motivated Christensen (1997) to coin the term “disruptive technol-
ogy”.
2For instance, Foster and Kaplan (2001) document that among the ﬁrms listed in the S&P
500 in 1957 only 2% are still listed and outperformed the index average in 1997, 13% are still
listed but underperformed it, while 85% were oﬀ the list.
1diﬀusion inside and outside the ﬁrm.
In a previous paper (Baccara and Razin (2003)), we introduce a simple bar-
gaining protocol that accounts for the presence of information leakage. In this
bargaining protocol, an agent who has a new idea tries to set up a team to develop
the idea into a marketable product. We assume that the development process re-
quires a team eﬀort, so that ideas cannot be developed alone. At the beginning
of the bargaining game, the innovator can make an oﬀer to any subset of a pool
of agents. All agents who receive the oﬀer learn the idea, i.e. become “informed”.
If the oﬀer is accepted by everybody, a team forms and the development takes
place. If the oﬀer is rejected by someone, a new negotiation ensues. As the set of
informed agents is enlarged, the race to carry out the development is more intense.
We model the intensity of the race by assuming that the probability any informed
a g e n tm a k e st h en e x to ﬀer is inversely related to the number of informed agents.
This model allows us to quantify the informational costs of the implementation of
a new idea into the market.
In this paper, we base our model on the bargaining protocol we described above.
We ﬁrst focus on an agent who becomes inspired with a new idea while working in
an established ﬁrm. In the model, this agent must choose between three courses of
action. He may decide to disclose the new idea within the ﬁrm (internal disclosure).
In this case, if the original ﬁrm develops the new product, the value of the ﬁrm
will increase. Alternatively, the agent can decide to leave the original ﬁrm and
form a spin-out that will compete to some degree with the old ﬁrm. Finally, the
agent may decide to forego the disclosure of the new idea and keep his current
compensation plan under the original ﬁrm.
Several factors aﬀect the employee’s decision. First, market structure consid-
erations come into play. By staying in the ﬁrm, the surplus is maximized as the
original ﬁrm will enjoy monopoly proﬁts for both the old and the new products.
In contrast, by forming a new ﬁr m ,s o m er e n t sm a yb el o s td u et oc o m p e t i t i o n
b e t w e e nt h eo l da n dt h en e wﬁrm.
Second, the organization and corporate governance structure of the original ﬁrm
are important. By forming a new ﬁrm, the employee can design his new venture
as he desires. In contrast, by staying in the original ﬁrm, the employee has to
follow the organizational procedures of the original ﬁrm. The level of bureaucracy,
hierarchical and ownership structure of the original ﬁrm may inﬂuence the outcome
of any attempt of the employee to introduce a new idea within the ﬁrm. In our
model, we use the number of people the innovator has to disclose the idea to within
the ﬁrm as shorthand for these aspects of the ﬁrm’s organization. As this number
varies, the information leakage patterns that occur in the negotiation varies as well,
2leading to diﬀerent outcomes for the innovator.
We focus on two extreme cases of ownership structure. “Egalitarian” ﬁrms
are modelled as ﬁrms in which ownership is equally distributed between all n
shareholders of the ﬁrm. “Dictatorial” ﬁrms are modelled as ﬁrms in which one
shareholder controls almost all the shares in the ﬁrm. We assume that a coalition
holding more that ﬁf t yp e r c e n to ft h es h a r e sc o n t r o l st h eﬁrm.
First, we analyze the innovator’s decision. We ﬁnd that in egalitarian ﬁrms,
employees will decide to form spin-outs when the ﬁrm is relatively large. Otherwise,
when the number of shareholders is small, employees will decide to reveal the idea
within the ﬁrm. On the other hand, in dictatorial ﬁrms, employees always decide
to disclose their information internally. This result highlights the ﬁrst eﬀect of
ownership structure or corporate governance on innovation in ﬁrms. The more
people are involved in the process of approving new products in the ﬁrm, the more
an employee stands to loose in terms of his control over the rents that the idea
may produce.
N e x t ,w ef o c u so nt h eo r i g i n a lﬁrm, In particular, we analyze the incentives
within the ﬁrm to promote or discourage innovation by employees. We start by
an observation related to our previous results. As implementing new ideas involve
(informational) costs, it might be in the best interest of an inspired employee
to remain silent and keep working under his current compensation scheme. In
other words, ﬁrms might anticipate their employees’ defection by oﬀering generous
compensation schemes to their employees. If these compensation schemes are equal
to the ex-post expected value of an idea, the ﬁrm can guarantee that its employees
will not defect (and will not introduce new ideas within the ﬁrm by starting a intra-
ﬁrm renegotiation as well). On the other hand, this possibility may be costly for
the ﬁrm, as the ﬁrm has to oﬀer ex-ante a compensation scheme that is equivalent
to the ex-post value of an idea for the employee.
Our results highlight a second relation between ownership structure and inno-
vation in ﬁrms.3 In particular, we show that the incentives for innovation depend
3From the start of the ‘Silicon Valley’ age there has been a great deal of discussion about
the unique and innovative way in which many of these ﬁrms organized themselves. One of the
symbols of ﬁrm culture and organization in Silicon Valley is what has been termed the “HP
way" referring to the way in which the Heward Peckard company organized itself since inception.
An important element of the ‘HP way’ was a democratization of the corporate governance and
ownership:
"... To lessen this threat at HP all employees enjoyed the same terms and conditions of
employment (i.e. a single status system operated). This included a share in the company’s proﬁts
and eligibility for stock options. Proﬁt sharing and shareholding in the company were widespread
from its earliest days. These were ﬁrst introduced as far back as 1945. When the company went
3on the ownership structure in ﬁrms. While shareholders in both types of ﬁrms
dislike employee defection, they diﬀer substantially in their incentives for avoiding
such outcomes or having employees bringing up new ideas within the ﬁrm. When
innovators are expected to introduce their ideas within the ﬁrm, the shareholders
in egalitarian ﬁrms always promote such innovations. Shares are initially divided
equally within the ﬁr ma n ds h a r e h o l d e r se x p e c tt ob ei n v o l v e di nt h ef u t u r ei m p l e -
mentation of the new idea and in the division of its rents. On the other hand, in a
dictatorial ﬁrm, the owner faces a trade-oﬀ: an innovation would increase the rents
the ﬁrm is producing but at the same time the new allocation of shares resulting
from the renegotiation might entail lower expected value for him.
As a result, we get predictions on the diﬀerent patterns of innovation in ﬁrms.
Innovation can be introduced on the market either by spin-out ﬁrms or by estab-
lished ﬁrms that keep on growing. Spin-outs tend to arise in equilibrium when
the original ﬁrm is egalitarian and buying-oﬀ of the innovative employees is too
costly. Internal disclosures are promoted and occur in small egalitarian ﬁrms. In
dictatorial ﬁrms innovation always takes the form of an internal disclosure. Inter-
estingly, we ﬁnd that sometimes it is optimal for the owner of a dictatorial ﬁrm to
discourage such disclosure nonetheless.
We next investigate the implication of information leakage on the ﬁrm’s or-
ganizational decisions. First, we show how hiring decision are aﬀected when the
possibility of future innovations are considered. We show how ﬁrms often take
ineﬃcient decisions compared to a scenario in which there are perfect intellectual
property rights.
Second, we focus on information provision within the ﬁrm.4 T h em o r ei n f o r -
mation is provided to employees the more eﬃcient they become in production. On
the other hand, the more information in the hands of employees, the higher is the
risk of these employees becoming inspired with new ideas. We show that these con-
siderations can lead to the asymmetric treatment of otherwise identical employees.
While some employees will be highly compensated and well informed about the
ﬁrm’s activities, others will be uninformed and paid wages that correspond to the
workers’ reservation utility.
Finally, we construct a dynamic example in which an endogenous life cycle for
ﬁrms arises. In the equilibrium, ﬁrms initially grow and innovate through internal
public, in 1957, all staﬀ, after six months tenure, became eligible for stock options. Bill and Dave
ﬁrmly believed that a dynamic, decentralised technology ﬁrm that relied on innovation as the
primary driver of its commercial success had to align the incentives of everyone in the company
— from top management to production workers." in Forster (2002).
4This problem is related to work by Zabojnik (2002) and Rajan and Zingales (2001).
4disclosures of ideas. As the ﬁrm becomes larger, innovations are introduced through
the formation of spin-outs. This implies the decline of the original ﬁrm and the
origin of a new life cycle for the next one.
The paper is organized as follows: after the literature review, we introduce
the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze the innovator’s problem (taking
the compensation scheme of the ﬁrm as given) and in Section 4 we analyze the
ﬁrm’s incentives to promote innovation. In Section 5 we extend the model in
diﬀerent directions, and we present an example of a dynamic version of it. Section
6 concludes the paper with suggestions for further research. The formal description
of the model (and in particular of the bargaining protocol) and all proofs are in
the Appendix.
1.1 Related literature
The economic literature on technological diﬀusion can be roughly divided into two
branches. First, papers like Jovanovic and McDonald (1994), Chari and Hopen-
hayn (1991), and Boldrin and Levine (2002 and 2004) study the macroeconomic
implications of information diﬀusion. These papers assume an exogenous mecha-
nism through which new technologies are made available to ﬁrms or individuals.5
On the other hand, several papers analyze informational concerns from an individ-
ual innovator’s point of view. This line of research has been carried out, among the
others, by Pakes and Nitzan (1983), Anton and Yao (1994), Rajan and Zingales
(2001) and, more recently, by Bhattacharya and Guriev (2004) and Modica (2004).
However, because of their diﬀerent focus, none of these papers is equipped to cap-
ture the phenomenon of information diﬀusion, innovation, and industry equilibrium
eﬀects.
This paper is a ﬁrst step to bridge these two strands of the literature. We think
that a better understanding of the strategic issues underlying cumulative research
and information diﬀusion can shed more light on the macro-implications of such
phenomenon. In particular, here we use the methodology developed in Baccara
and Razin (2003) to study the problem of cumulative research in ﬁrms. We think
that the same methodology can be used to understand a very wide set of issues
related to innovation and intellectual property.
The problem of incremental research has been analyzed from a normative per-
spective by Scotchmer (1991 and 2005), and the phenomena of workers’ mobility
5See also Schivardi and Schneider (2001) for an interesting model on the episodes of ‘disrup-
tive changes’ that analyzes the adoption of new technologies of incumbent ﬁrms after entrants
innovate.
5and spin-out formation have been analyzed by Anton and Yao (1995), Klepper
(2001), Franco and Filson (2002) and Lewis and Yao (2003). The paper with the
focus closest to ours is Anton and Yao (1995). Anton and Yao use a setting that is
diﬀerent from ours in the sense that in their case ex-ante negotiation on new ideas
is possible. However, but innovators have to face an adverse selection problem that
may lead them to leave the ﬁrm and form their own start-ups. Moreover, in their
setting the problem of information leakage ceases to aﬀect the negotiating sides
after the idea has been disclosed to the ﬁrm (i.e., ﬁrms do not face the problem of
information expropriation as innovators do).
This paper is also related to the vast literature on corporate governance.6 Notice
that in our model we completely abstract from the issue (that is at the core of the
corporate governance literature) of the separation between ownership and control
(in particular, the conﬂict between the manager and outside shareholders, and
the one between large and minority shareholders). In this paper, we make the
assumption that decisions within the ﬁrm are made by shareholders by majority
rule, and it is necessary to negotiate directly with a shareholder to have her vote.
Even if we think this assumption ﬁts quite well the reality of high-tech start-ups
and small partnerships, notice that it is made mainly for simplicity. One could
reinterpret our deﬁnition of “dictatorial” ﬁrms as ﬁrms where decisions can be
made involving a few people (a decentralized and eﬃcient ﬁrm) and our deﬁnition
of an “egalitarian” as a ﬁrm in which decision can only be made with the approval
of many people (a hierarchical and rather bureaucratic ﬁrm).7 Our results ﬁnd
a link, that is novel in the corporate governance literature, between the decision-
making structure of a ﬁrm and the likelihood of success in staying ahead in the
innovation race.
Our analysis formalizes (in Section 5.3) the notion that large established ﬁrms
are often stagnant and prone to dissolution by small innovative spin-outs (‘The
Curse of Incumbency’). Explanations for this puzzle are often based on unaware-
ness or bounded rationality of established ﬁrms when making decisions regarding
new technologies. In particular, Christensen (1997) suggests that established ﬁrms
tend to focus too much attention to their current customer base, not realizing that
the existing customers are not the best predictors of tomorrow’s market.8 In con-
trast, we oﬀer a rational decision making model in which the size of the ﬁrm is
6For a survey, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
7See for instance Stein (2002).
8Large ﬁrms tend to miss opportunities to innovate as they are focused on a speciﬁcp r o d u c t
and its consumers. They overlook technological innovation that may seem irrelevant, but in the
long run tends to become “disruptive”.
6directly linked to the vulnerability of the ﬁrm to defection from within.
2T h e M o d e l
Assume that there is a ﬁrm producing a patented product. The production of
the ﬁrm requires labor as an input. Let us assume for simplicity that in order to
produce, the ﬁrm needs to hire exactly one employee. There is an inﬁnite supply
of potential employees, and their reservation wage is zero. Let w be the wage
(endogenously) set by the ﬁrm to compensate the employee.
After working in the ﬁrm for one period, the employee is inspired with a new
idea. As we describe in Section 2.1, the new idea can be implemented either within
the ﬁrm or outside the ﬁrm, with an independent spin-out. The new product
competes to some degree with the old product, and the proﬁts of the ﬁrms on
the market are the following: (i) one ﬁrm producing only the old product enjoys
ar e n to fπ<1 per period, (ii) one ﬁrm producing both the old and the new
products receives a rent of 1, (iii) if two ﬁrms produce one the old and the other
the new product, they receive π1 and π2 respectively.9 We assume that if there is
more than one ﬁrm on the new product market, Bertrand competition dissipates
all the proﬁts.10 This assumption captures cases in which new technologies are not
protected by intellectual property rights.11
In our analysis, we are interested in modelling explicitly the corporate gover-
nance in the original ﬁrm. In what follows we take a simplifying view of corporate
governance in which the ﬁrm is governed by the majority of shareholders. In par-
ticular, from the point of view of an inspired employee, let n0 ≥ 1 be the minimal
n u m b e ro fp e o p l et h a tn e e dt oa p p r o v ean e wp r o d u c tl i n ei no r d e rf o ri tt ob ei m -
plemented.12 The number n0 depends on how the shares are distributed across the
9Notice that the patent on the old product guarantees that there cannot be two ﬁrms pro-
ducting the old product.
10Notice that in general, when there is Bertratnd competition on the new product, the old ﬁrm
can still earn some small π0
1 <π 1 from the old product. For simplicity, we assume π0
1 =0 .
11Our results in this paper hold for more general market structure assumptions. In particular,
all the results in Sections 3 and 4 can be replicated for the case of the new product receiving a
patent at the end of the development stage. These two alternative market structure assumptions
capture the polar cases of the results in Baccara and Razin (2003). In particular, the case of
patent protecion corresponds to the “Partial Protection” regime in Baccara and Razin (2003),
while in this paper we focus on the “No Protection” regime. See that paper for a more general
analysis that accounts for all the possible conﬁgurations of market competition.
12Note that the approach we take here restricts the number m0 to be directly tied to the
distribution of the shares. More generally, this number may depend on other factors like the level
7shareholders and on the number of shareholders. For instance, if there are n share-
holders (where n is odd) and the shares are equally distributed, then n0 = n+1
2 .I f
one shareholder controls almost all the shares, then n0 =1for any n. In general,
n0 is weakly increasing in the size of the ﬁrm. When we analyze the decision taken
in the ﬁrm about compensation, hiring and information provision (Section 4), we
assume that the decisions are taken to maximize the utility of the ruling coalition
within the ﬁrm.
For simplicity, we focus on two extreme distributions of shares within ﬁrms.
‘Egalitarian’ ﬁrms have n shareholders each with an equal stake in the ﬁrm. ‘Dic-
tatorial’ ﬁrms are ﬁrms in which there is one shareholder holding almost all the
shares in the ﬁrm.
Once an employee decides whether to disclose his idea to someone, either within
the ﬁrm or outside, a bargaining game ensues. We next introduce our model of
bargaining over new ideas.
2.1 Bargaining on new ideas
We assume that there are no perfect intellectual property rights on ideas. This
implies that the bargaining over any new idea is aﬀected by the risk of information
leakage. In this paper we model bargaining with information leakage using the
protocol developed in Baccara and Razin (2003). Three assumptions underlie this
protocol. First, we assume that no agent can develop a new idea into a product on
his own. In particular we assume that m+1individuals are needed to develop the
product and that nothing is gained by having more than m+1agents working on
it (we take m as a measure of the labor intensity of the development of the new
product). Second, we assume that the act of recruiting entails sharing information
about the idea. Finally, our third assumption relates to the asymmetry between
informed and uninformed agents. As the only element diﬀerentiating otherwise
h o m o g e n e o u sa g e n t si st h ek n o w l e d g eo ft h ei d e a ,w ec a p t u r et h i sa s y m m e t r yb y
assuming that oﬀers can be made only by informed agents.13
The bargaining protocol is as follows.14 The employee who is inspired with a
new idea can make an oﬀer to any number of other agents (either the shareholders of
of bureaucracy and decentralization in the ﬁr m . A sl o n ga st h i sn u m b e ri si n c r e a s i n gw i t ht h e
size of the ﬁrm, our qualitative results will hold.
13This assumption is motivated by the uninformed agents being unaware of the existence of
the idea or of its potential proﬁtability. They become aware of it only when approached by an
informed agent for the ﬁrst time.
14We provide a formal description of the bargaining protocol in the Appendix.
8the original ﬁrm or any other agent out of the inﬁnite pool of potential employees),
or can stay silent. If he stays silent, the game ends, the innovator gets w and the
original ﬁrm splits the proﬁt π − w according with the original share allocation.
We refer to an oﬀer which includes the n0 agents required to introduce the
new product within the ﬁrm as an internal disclosure, and to any other oﬀer as a
spin-out. Notice that, according to this deﬁn i t i o n ,a na g e n tc a nf o r mas p i n - o u t
also by making an oﬀer to some agents that are part of the original ﬁrm, as long as
they are not the controlling majority. In this case, if the oﬀer is accepted, a group
of agents will leave the original ﬁrm to form a spin-out.
Any oﬀer on the new idea implies information leakage, that is, all the agents
receiving the oﬀer become informed about the new idea themselves. All those who
are part of an oﬀer respond simultaneously. If an oﬀer is accepted unanimously,
the new product is introduced by the new team and the proﬁts are realized on
the market.15 If an oﬀer is rejected by anyone, a competition ensues among all
the agents who are informed about the new idea up to that point. We model this
competition by assuming that upon any rejection Nature chooses the next proposer
in the bargaining on the new idea with the same probability among all the agents
who are informed.
Every proposer in the bargaining (even if he was not in the original ﬁrm) can
decide whether to try and bring the idea back to the shareholders of the original
ﬁrm, or form a spin-out ﬁrm outside the original ﬁrm.16 After an agreement has
been reached to introduce the new idea on the market, there could be informed
agents left outside the agreement. In this case, the game goes on until a second
ﬁrm has formed to market the new idea. This implies that the possible outcomes
of the bargaining can be the following: (i) an internal disclosure with a monopoly
on the new product, (ii) a spin-out with a monopoly on the new product, (iii) an
internal disclosure with another ﬁrm marketing the new product (iv) a spin-out
with another ﬁrm marketing the new product.
15Note that as we use unanimity as the rule that governs the formation of a ﬁrm, the oﬀers are
conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents involved. This implies that agents cannot make
an oﬀer that is binding as soon as at least one agent accepts it (unconditional oﬀer). We ﬁnd
these kinds of oﬀers unﬁt for our applied situation because we want to capture the competition
that arises among the informed agents once they all know the information. In order to do so, we
give the possibility of counter-oﬀers to all the informed agents. See Baccara and Razin (2003)
for an extensive discussion of this assumption.
16Notice that the deﬁnition of spin-out we use in this paper refers to the idea being generated
in the original ﬁrm and implemented outside, rather than the new ﬁrm necessarily being run by
a former employee of the original ﬁrm. However, since there will be no delays in the bargaining,
when a spin-out forms in equilibrium, the former employee is always the one who originates it.
9We assume that there are frictions in bargaining due to impatience. These
frictions are represented by a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).E v e r y t i m e w e
enter a negotiation subgame, payoﬀs in that subgame are discounted by δ.17 If
no agreement on the implementation of the new idea is reached, the original ﬁrm
carries on its production and all the shareholders get their share of the proﬁt π,
while all the other agents have a reservation value normalized to zero. We assume
all the agents are risk-neutral.
2.2 Timing
To summarize the description of the model made so far, here we present the timing
of the game.
(1) The original ﬁrm (with n shareholders) hires an employee and promises him
ap a y m e n tw
(2) The employee works for the ﬁrm and has an idea for a new product
(3) The employee decides whether to disclose his idea to someone and start
bargaining on it, or to stay silent.
(4a) If he stays silent the game ends. The ﬁrm gets a proﬁto fπ, the employee
is paid w and π − w is divided according to the distribution of shares in the ﬁrm.
(4b) If the employee starts a bargaining on his idea, the bargaining game de-
scribed in Section 2.1 ensues. The outcome of the bargaining can be one of the
following.
(5a) If the outcome of the bargaining is an internal disclosure with monopoly
on the new product, the old ﬁrm realizes a proﬁt of one on the market, which is
divided according to the accepted oﬀer.
(5b) If the outcome of the bargaining is a spin-out with a monopoly on the
new product, the old ﬁrm realizes π1, which is divided according to the initial
distribution of the shares, and the spin-out realizes π2, which is divided according
to the accepted oﬀer.
(5c) If the outcome of the bargaining is an internal disclosure with a second
ﬁrm marketing the new product, the proﬁts are driven down to zero, so all agents
get zero.
(5d) If the outcome of the bargaining is a spin-out with a second ﬁrm marketing
the new products, the proﬁts are driven down to zero, so all agents get zero.
17Notice that, although our results in Sections 3 and 4 hold for any δ ∈ (0,1), for simplicity of
exposition in those Sections we present them for δ ≈ 1.
10As in Baccara and Razin (2003), we focus on Symmetric Subgame Perfect
Equilibria in the analysis of this game.18 In particular, we restrict our attention to
the equilibria which do not require agents to use weakly dominated strategies.
2.3 Fundamental Lemma
The following Lemma is helpful for the analysis to come. In Baccara and Razin
(2003) we prove the following result:19
Lemma 1 A monopoly on the new idea always arises in equilibrium. Moreover,
any oﬀer always includes all the agents who are informed about the new idea at
that time.
A consequence of Lemma 1 is that innovators have to pay each agent they
include in an oﬀer that includes s agents, a share δ
s+1 of the proﬁto ft h ef u t u r e
ﬁrm. Since every agent who receives an oﬀer becomes informed of the new idea,
in equilibrium they are included in every subsequent oﬀer that will be made. This
guarantees that every agent included in the oﬀer receives an equal part of the pie
and, as δ tends to 1, this share is equal to the innovator’s one.20
3 The Innovator’s Dilemma
In this Section we focus on the problem of the innovative employee of the original
ﬁrm. Recall that such an employee is expected to receive a wage w from the ﬁrm,
but he also has a new idea and has to decide whether to disclose his idea within
the ﬁrm, leave the ﬁrm and form a spin-out, or not implement the idea at all.
In the following two results we highlight the impact of the original ﬁrm’s size
and structure on the optimal decision of the employee.
Proposition 1 If the original ﬁrm is egalitarian, then there is a w such that (i)
if w>w, then the innovator does not disclose his idea at all, (ii) if w<w then
18We deﬁne Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria formally in the Appendix.
19In particular, see Propositions 7 and 10 of Baccara and Razin (2003).
20Lemma 1 is a consequence of the assumption that two ﬁrms producing the new products
have zero proﬁts. Things would be diﬀerent under alternative assumptions of less aggressive
competition between the two ﬁrms. For instance, one could assume that the ﬁrst ﬁrm to introduce
the new idea on the market enjoys a monopoly on it. In that case, Propositions 6 and 9 in Baccara
and Razin (2003) would apply: in equilibrium the innovator enjoys an additional eﬀect we named
“the information diﬀusion advantage”, and his payoﬀ turns out to be higher.
11the innovator will leave the ﬁrm and form a spin-out if the size of the original ﬁrm
is high enough, otherwise he reveals the idea within the ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 shows that in the case of an egalitarian ﬁrm, when a new idea
arises, the size of the ﬁrm inﬂuences the optimal choice of the innovator. As the size
becomes larger, the renegotiation the innovator faces if he discloses the idea within
the ﬁrm becomes less and less proﬁtable for him. In particular, the renegotiation
within the ﬁrm leads a payoﬀ of 1
n+1 for the innovator, while a spin-out, in which
just the minimal number of agents required to develop the product get the oﬀer,
l e a d st oap a y o ﬀ of π2
m+1.T h i si m p l i e st h a tas p i n - o u ti sm o r el i k e l yt oe m e r g ea s
n becomes larger.
Note that for this result to be true, our assumptions about corporate governance
does not need to be taken literally. In particular, n0 can be interpreted more
generally as some measure of the “bureaucracy” in the ﬁrm. What is important
for the result to be true is that the number of people who would be involved in
the decision to develop the new idea within the ﬁrm is increasing in the size of the
ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 If the original ﬁrm is dictatorial, then there is w such that if
w<w, the innovator discloses the idea within the ﬁrm and if w>w, then the
innovator does not disclose his idea anywhere. Therefore, spin-out ﬁrms never
arise in equilibrium.
The previous Proposition shows that if the distribution of shares of the original
ﬁrm is very concentrated, the renegotiation within the original ﬁrm becomes less
costly for the innovator. This implies that, in the case of a dictatorial ﬁrm, spin-
outs will never occur, and if a new idea is implemented at all, it is implemented
within the original ﬁrm. Notice that the agent who originally held all the shares
of the ﬁrm is left with just the 1
m+1-th fraction of the shares at the end of the
negotiation. This illustrates the fact that internal disclosures tend to equalize
ownership in dictatorial ﬁrms.
We now proceed to check the implications of Propositions 1 and 2 on the deci-
sions of the original ﬁrm about employee compensation, allowing spin-out forma-
tion, hiring decisions and information provision within the ﬁrm.
4T h e F i r m ’ s P r o b l e m
The previous section has illustrated the problem that ﬁrms and in particular share-
holders face when confronted with the possibility of employees becoming creative.
12These employees will sometimes decide to leave, start their own ﬁrm and later com-
pete with the original ﬁrm. Even if they decide to stay within the original ﬁrm,
the introduction of the innovation and the subsequent negotiation will reshuﬄet h e
shares within the ﬁrm in a way that may hurt the original shareholders.
We highlight several channels through which ﬁrms can curtail the eﬀects gen-
erated by innovative employees. In this section we analyze the ability of ﬁrms to
buy-oﬀ potential innovators by assuring that their initial compensation package
dominates any expected post-innovation rents. We show that a consequence of the
presence of information leakage is that any buying-oﬀ of an employee must be done
before that employee is inspired about the new idea.
4.1 Buying-oﬀ Potential Innovators
In what follows we solve the ﬁrm’s problem, that is we analyze the choice of the
optimal w given the behavior expected from the employee once he becomes inno-
vative. Let us recall that w, the salary of an employee, is set by the controlling
coalition of shareholders, that the initial outside option of this employee is normal-
ized to zero and there is no issue of information leakage in the hiring of employees
to the original ﬁrm.
Before proceeding to the results let us provide the intuition for how a ﬁrm
might buy-oﬀ an employee. Suppose that when an agent is inspired with a new
idea, the best course of action (excluding the possibility of remaining silent) will
l e a dt oap a y o ﬀ of v. Alternatively, by remaining silent the employee can always
guarantee himself w. To buy-oﬀ the employee, the ﬁrm needs to pay the employee
at least v. Therefore, if the ﬁr md e c i d e st ob u yt h ee m p l o y e eo ﬀ, it will set the
current compensation of the employee at w = v. This will guarantee that when the
employee has an idea nothing will change in the ﬁrm and the new idea will not be
implemented.
Let us make two remarks. First, note that w has to be set before the inspiration
occurs. Indeed, the ﬁrm cannot rely on the agent to come back and renegotiate
his compensation ex-post. This is because the presence of information leakage
will modify the bargaining power of the employee within the ﬁrm as soon as the
renegotiation starts. In particular, at that stage the employee might decide to try
his luck outside the ﬁrm without starting a renegotiation of his contract that would
lead to a leakage of his idea within the ﬁrm.
Second, the distribution of shares within the original ﬁrm is important in the
analysis for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section 3, the distribution of shares
aﬀects the choice of the employee of whether to introduce the idea in the original
13ﬁrm or outside this ﬁrm. Second, the distribution of shares determines the incen-
tives of the “ruling" coalition to buy-oﬀ the agent or not. In particular, we ﬁnd
that in an egalitarian ﬁr m ,i fs h a r e h o l d e r se x p e c tt h a tt h ee m p l o y e ei sg o i n gt oi n -
troduce the idea within the ﬁrm, it is in their interest to allow this to happen and
there is no buying-oﬀ of the employee. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm is dictatorial,
the owner of the ﬁrm may want to discourage this. The following two Propositions
summarize these observations.
Proposition 3 In an egalitarian ﬁr m ,i fa ni n t e r n a ld i s c l o s u r ei se x p e c t e d ,t h e r e
is no buying-oﬀ. If a spin-out is expected, buying-oﬀ will take place if π2
m+1 is
relatively small, otherwise a spin-out forms in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 highlights that in an egalitarian ﬁrm an internal disclosure is
always encouraged. The value of the ﬁrm is equally shared, before and after dis-
closure. If the ﬁrm decides to discourage disclosure, it has to pay the innovator
enough to keep him indiﬀerent between staying silent and disclosing his idea in-
ternally. This implies that shareholders always prefer the value of the ﬁrm to
increase, even if they will have to share it with one more partner. Alternatively,
when a spin-out is expected, the cost of buying-oﬀ t h ee m p l o y e ed e p e n d so nh i s
payoﬀ in a spin-out, i.e.
π2
m+1. If this cost is high enough, buying-oﬀ does not occur
in equilibrium, and a spin-out arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In a dictatorial ﬁrm, in which internal disclosure is always ex-
pected, buying-oﬀ occurs when the idea is relatively labor intensive (that is, m is
high).
From Proposition 2 we know that forming a spin-out is never optimal for an
innovator working in a dictatorial ﬁr m ,a sa ni n t e r n a ld i s c l o s u r ea l w a y sd o m i n a t e s
leaving the ﬁrm . Proposition 4 shows that the owner of a dictatorial ﬁrm can still
prefer to buy-oﬀ the innovative employee. The reason for this is the reshuﬄing of
the ownership of the ﬁrm upon disclosure. Before the disclosure, one shareholder
owned almost the entire value of the ﬁrm. After the disclosure, the value of the ﬁrm
increases, but the bargaining over the new idea entails a more equitable ownership
structure between all those involved in the development of the new idea. As the
idea requires more people to be developed, the bargaining will involve more agents
and the share of each of them is going to be smaller. This implies that the owner has
more incentive to deter the disclosure of the new idea by buying-oﬀ the innovator.
14It is interesting to stress the diﬀerence between the cases in which buying-
oﬀ occurs in egalitarian and in dictatorial ﬁrms. In an egalitarian ﬁrm buying-
oﬀ occurs only to prevent a spin-out. When an internal disclosure is expected,
the eﬃcient outcome is always realized as the innovation stays in the ﬁrm and
it is implemented. In the case of a dictatorial ﬁrm, in which spin-outs are never
expected, buying-oﬀ can still occur, causing the ﬁrm to stop introducing innovation.
4.2 Examples
In the following two examples we explore the implications of our results on two
important cases of market structure: (i) Strong competition between old and
new product. The competition between two ﬁrms producing one the old and the
other the new products is strong enough to nullify all the rents, i.e. π1 = π2 =0 .
(ii) Vertical innovation. The new product is an improvement of the old one
under every dimension, resulting in the market for the old product to disappear in
case the new one is introduced by a competing ﬁrm, i.e. π1 =0and π2 =1 .
Strong competition between old and new product. If π1 = π2 =0a
spin-out is never expected. From Proposition 3 we know that an egalitarian ﬁrm
would always introduce the innovation, while a dictatorial ﬁrm will buy-oﬀ the
innovator only if π> 2
m+1.
In this case, egalitarian ﬁrms lead to more innovations than dictatorial ﬁrms.
The reason for this is that the strong market competitions makes employees shy
away from forming spin-outs. As egalitarian ownership structures always promote
internal disclosure, these ﬁrms will always innovate. On the other hand, dictatorial
ﬁrms would sometimes have incentives to discourage such disclosures out of fear of
ar e s h u ﬄing of shares within the ﬁrm.
Vertical innovation. If π1 =0and π2 =1 , we have that without buying-oﬀ
in an egalitarian ﬁrm a spin-out will always emerge. Then, an egalitarian ﬁrm will
buy-oﬀ the innovator if and only if π> 1
m+1. On the other hand, in a dictatorial
ﬁrm, the buying-oﬀ will occur if and only if π> 2
m+1.21
Observe that in the vertical innovation case the new product will be introduced
o nt h em a r k e tm o r eo f t e nw i t had i c t a t o r i a lﬁrm than in an egalitarian ﬁrm. This
market structure promotes spin-outs to occur when ﬁrms are egalitarian. As a
21Note that this is an extreme case in which the innovator in a dictatorial ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between forming a spin-out and an internal disclosure.
15consequence, these ﬁrms will take measures to discourage employees from leaving
the ﬁrm by buying them oﬀ.D i c t a t o r i a l ﬁr m sa l s oh a v ei n c e n t i v e st ob u y - o ﬀ
employees in this case, for reasons similar to the previous example.
Although both types of ﬁr m sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st ob u y - o ﬀ employees, their in-
centives diﬀer markedly. The consequence of a spin-out for an egalitarian ﬁrm is
zero proﬁts, while the consequence of an internal disclosure to the original owner
of a dictatorial ﬁrm is a rent of 1
m+1 > 0. Therefore, we will tend to see more
innovations happening when ﬁrms are dictatorial.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this Section, we examine the implication of our ﬁndings on the organization and
lifecycle of a ﬁrm. We ﬁrst analyze a ﬁrm’s hiring decisions and provide results
showing that ﬁrms chooses to produce ineﬃciently (i.e. with few employees), in
order to limit the eﬀects of future innovation. Then, we analyze information provi-
sion within a ﬁrm. We assume that the more information is provided to employees,
t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v et h e ya r ei nt h eﬁrm. On the other hand, if innovation is cu-
mulative, the more information employees have about what the ﬁrm produces, the
more they will be able to use this information to come up with their own ideas.
We show that often this trade-oﬀ will be solved asymmetrically within the ﬁrm. In
particular, there will be two types of employees. Some employees will be bought-oﬀ
and will receive all the relevant information about the ﬁrm. Other employees will
be given the minimum level of compensation and will be provided with limited
information about the ﬁrm’s production.
5.1 The Hiring Decision
We now focus on the decision of the ﬁrm of whether to hire new employees or not.
Hiring new employees may be eﬃcient in terms of increasing production but in
our framework the costs of hiring are related to the possibility of the employees
becoming innovative.
Suppose that currently the ﬁrm has to decide whether to hire one agent or not.
The decision of hiring an agent has several implications. First, the worker increases
the rents of the original ﬁrm by increasing production of the original product. We
model this by assuming that rents from the original product are π whereas if the
n e we m p l o y e ei sh i r e dr e n t sa r eπ>π . Second, the employee may become inspired
(as in the previous sections, we assume that the probability of this event is one).
16If the ﬁrm decides to hire the agent, then the ﬁrm has to decide what com-
pensation plan to provide him with. This decision was analyzed in the previous
section. Let us recall that the initial distribution of shares within the original ﬁrm
aﬀects the outcome of that decision. Therefore, the distribution of shares will also
inﬂuence the hiring decisions of ﬁrms. The following proposition characterizes the
hiring decisions of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Proposition 5 (i) In both types of ﬁrms, hiring becomes more attractive as the
new idea is more labor intensive, i.e. m is larger, and the higher is the marginal
productivity of the employee (ii) In an “egalitarian" ﬁrm, hiring decisions depend
negatively on the employee’s outside option, π2 (iii) In a “dictatorial" ﬁrm, hiring
decisions depend positively on the outside option of the ﬁrm, π1 (whereas they do
not depend on π2).
In both types of ﬁrms, an increase in m implies a decrease in the cost of hiring.
This is evident, as any innovator must divide the rents that he generates among
at least m individuals. Note, however, the diﬀerence in the key variables that
determine the ﬁrms’ hiring decisions in the two types of ﬁrms. As we saw in the
previous sections, a dictatorial ﬁrm expects its employee to introduce the new idea
in-house. Therefore, the cost of hiring an employee is related to the price of buying-
oﬀ this employee. Remember that an employee’s share from introducing the idea
within the ﬁrm is proportional to the surplus that is available in the ﬁrm minus
the outside option of the owner, π1. The larger is π1 the less costly it is to buy-oﬀ
the employee and therefore the more proﬁt a b l ei ti st oh i r eh i m .
On the other hand, an egalitarian ﬁrm will have a trade-oﬀ in its hiring decision
when it expects its employee to leave the ﬁrm with the new idea. In this case,
buying-oﬀ the employee implies guaranteeing an amount that will compensate him
for his outside option that depends on π2.
5.2 Information Provision
In this section we investigate the optimal information provision within a ﬁrm. In
the presence of a potentially innovative employee, a ﬁrm may face a trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, the more information is communicated to employees the more
eﬃcient the production process is. On the other hand, the more information in the
hands of employees, the more they learn about the technology and the more likely
t h e ya r et ob ei n s p i r e dw i t hn e wi d e a s .
We illustrate how information leakage concerns may result in an asymmetric
treatment of otherwise symmetric employees. We will show that often the optimal
17structure of the ﬁrm will involve some agents being fully informed and highly
compensated while others receiving minimum compensation and being relatively
uninformed.
We now introduce a model of information provision.22 Let π(x1,x 2) for x1,x 2 ∈
[0,1] be the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm given that two agents receive the information levels
x1 and x2 respectively (xi may represent the level of information about the market,
the production processes, the technology, and so on). We assume that production
is increasing in the level of information of employees. i.e. π(x1,x 2) is increasing
in both arguments. Let α(xi) be the probability of agent i having a new idea
given that his information is xi. We assume that α is increasing, convex and
that α0(0) = 0. The events in which the two employees become inspired are
stochastically independent from each other. An idea may potentially bring about
the rent of one if implemented within the original ﬁrm and the rent of π2 (leaving
the original ﬁrm with a rent of π1) when implemented outside the original ﬁrm.23
The game proceeds as follows. The owner of the ﬁrm decides the levels of
information of the two employees, (x1,x 2), and the compensation of each of the
employees, (w1,w 2). New ideas are realized according to the probabilities α(x1) and
α(x2) and the inspired employee/s decide whether to disclose the idea internally,
leave the ﬁrm and start a new ﬁrm or keep the status quo. The following proposition
characterizes the ﬁrm’s optimal information provision decision.
Proposition 6 In both types of ﬁrms, the optimal information provision schemes
are of one of the following forms: (i) Both agents are fully informed and bought-oﬀ.
(ii) One agent is fully informed and bought-oﬀ while the other receives minimum
compensation and is informed to some level. (iii) Both agents receive minimum
compensation and are informed to some level.
An interesting implication of Proposition 6 is that often the solution to the
ﬁrm’s problem will involve an asymmetric treatment of otherwise symmetric em-
ployees. The intuition for this result is based on two simple features of the model.
22Note that this can also be interpreted as a model of task allocation within the ﬁrm. Under
this interpretation we analyze the compensation levels that are associated with diﬀerent tasks in
the ﬁrm.
23Note that for simplicity we assume that the rents of the idea do not depend on the level of
information of the employee. Our results will hold more generally, provided that there is a lower
bound to the rent a new idea generates. Also, we assume that the two ideas are not competing
against each other, i.e. the proﬁt generated by any idea is independent on the second being
implemented or not. Notice also that for simplicity we assume that the proﬁt of the original ﬁrm
π1 is the same in case of one or two ideas being implemented outside the ﬁrm.
18First, when the ﬁrm decides to buy-oﬀ an additional employee, there is a discrete
j u m pi nt h ec o m p e n s a t i o ni th a st op a yt ot h i se m p l o y e ee v e nb e f o r eh ei si n s p i r e d .
This is because buying-oﬀ involves compensation that is equal to the ex-post value
of the new idea
Second, if a ﬁrm buys-oﬀ an employee, it guarantees that this agent will not
leave the ﬁrm (or introduce the idea within the ﬁrm). If information provision is
more related to the probability that the employee is inspired than to the rents such
an agent will secure if he is inspired, then the ﬁrm might as well provide him with
the full information.24
5.3 Lifecycle of a Firm
In this Section we analyze the implications of our results to a ﬁrm’s lifecycle.
In particular, we introduce a dynamic model that starts at time t =0with an
innovator having an idea for a new product. The bargaining for the formation of
a ﬁrm that will develop this product is aﬀected by information leakage. Once the
ﬁrm is formed, the development of the product takes place, a patent is acquired
and more employees are hired. At every period, one employee is inspired with a
new idea, and faces the same set of choices we considered in the model introduced
in Section 2, namely remaining silent, disclosing the idea internally, or forming
as p i n - o u tﬁrm. We normalize the initial proﬁto ft h eﬁrm to be one, and we
assume that every idea introduced within the ﬁrm increases the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm
by a coeﬃcient of γ>1. This implies that a ﬁrm marketing all products up the
t-th generation has a proﬁto fγt. On the other hand, when the t-th new idea is
introduced into the market by a spin-out ﬁrm, and it competes against the previous
product, the original ﬁrm gets γtπ1 and the spin-out gets γtπ2,w i t hπ1 + π2 < 1.
Also, we assume that all ideas require a similar to be developed. This similarity
is reﬂected in our model by the fact that ideas require the same number of people
(i.e., m+1)t ob ed e v e l o p e d . 25 We assume that ideas are cumulative, that is, it is
necessary to have worked on the t- t hi d e at oh a v et h et+1-th idea. Future proﬁts
24More generally, if the information provision aﬀects also the rents an agent might secure ex-
post, the ﬁrm may not provide him with all the information, but will be more inclined to provide
him with more information than if he were not “bought-oﬀ”.
25This assumption could be easily replaced with ideas requiring an increasing number of people
to be developed as they become more and more advanced without changing the main points of
the analysis.
19are discounted by a factor δ
0 ∈ [0,1].26 Finally, we assume that after a period
without innovation, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm disappear (for instance because imitators
start producing similar products after two periods).
The following result highlights the implications of our previous analysis on the
lifecycle of a ﬁrm.
Proposition 7 There is an equilibrium such that for some ¯ t ≥ 0,i faﬁrm existed
f o rl e s st h a no rf o re x a c t l y¯ t periods, new ideas are always disclosed internally and
introduced on the market within the ﬁrm. After ¯ t periods, the next innovation is
introduced forming a spin-out, and a new ﬁrm starts its growth. If γδ
0 < 1, there
exist parameters for which ¯ t ≥ 1.
The engine behind the ﬁrm’s lifecycle in Proposition 7 is the fact that an in-
novating ﬁrm grows in size. As employees introduce new ideas within the ﬁrm,
their bargaining power vis-a-vis the ﬁrm increases. As a result, these employees
will be involved in the future decisions of the ﬁrm. In our model this increase in
power is captured by the fact that innovative employees become partners of the
ﬁrm themselves. At some point, when the number of shareholders is large enough,
new innovative employees tend to form spin-outs.
We want to stress the fact that even if the increase in growth occurs for other
reasons (e.g., bureaucracy), the above results on the lifecycle of ﬁrms are similar:
as long as the ﬁrm is small in size we expect internal disclosure and growth. As
the size of ﬁrms increases, there is a higher tendency to form a spin-out.
Finally, in this model we have abstracted away from the possibility of ﬁrms
to buy-oﬀ their employees. Adding this possibility to the model will keep the
qualitative results intact but will enrich the set of manifestations of the ‘Curse of
Incumbency’. In particular, in such a model, a possible detriment of an established
ﬁrm will be the lack of innovation due to the buying-oﬀ of its employees.
6 Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper we examine the eﬀects of information leakage on the decisions ﬁrms
make to encourage or discourage creativity in their workplace. We oﬀer an applica-
b l em o d e lo fb a r g a i n i n gi nt h ep r e s e n c eo fi n f o r m a t i o nl e a k a g e . W ea n a l y z et h e
26This discount factor is diﬀerent from the discount factor δ a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c ht h ep a y o ﬀsa r e
discounted in the bargaining on new ideas.
20decisions of innovative employees to reveal their ideas within the ﬁrms, form spin-
out ventures or to remain silent about their ideas. We show that the ownership
structure of the original ﬁrm is an important factor in this decision.
We believe that our methodology is applicable to a wide range of issues that
p e r t a i nt ot h ee v o l u t i o no fﬁrms and industries. In Baccara and Razin (2004) we
examine the measures ﬁrms use to secure their information in the context of an
industry cluster.
As a motivation, it is interesting to compare the two distinct cultures that had
developed in two regional industrial zones in the United States, namely Silicon
Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts. This comparison is interesting
as these two regions are similar in many respects: the two industrial regions are
active in similar markets (i.e., the high-tech industry), both regions were energized
after WWII by government investment and by a relationship with local universities
(MIT and Stanford). Finally, both industries are in the US, and share similar legal
environments.27
In contrast to these similarities, the two regions had developed into two very
diﬀerent models of industrial organization. While Silicon Valley adopted a network-
based culture characterized by high labor mobility, Route 128 was organized into
an individual ﬁrm-based system in which large integrated ﬁrms had a long life-span.
In Silicon Valley labor mobility was very high and a long resume’ was interpreted
as a good sign of experience and knowledge. In contrast, in Route 128, loyalty to
the ﬁrm was highly valued, labor mobility very low and spontaneous regrouping of
workers rare.
Evidence suggests that the rate of innovation was overwhelmingly higher in
Silicon Valley in comparison to Route 128. Saxenian (1994) links the diﬀerences
in labor mobility and culture between the two regions to a diﬀerence in the rate of
innovation and adaptation to changes.28 Implicit in these observations is the idea
27Hyde (2002), however, claims that the enforcement of trade secret law and no-compete agree-
ments in Silicon Valley is weak in comparison to Route 128. On the other hand, Saxenian (1995)
argues for a cultural diﬀerence between the two regions in terms of legal standards.
28In her own words: “In a network-based industrial system like Silicon Valley, the region (..)
is organized to adapt continuously to fast-changing markets and technologies. The system’s de-
centralization encourages the pursuit of multiple technical opportunities through spontaneous
regroupings of skill, technology and capital. Its production networks promote a process of col-
lective technological learning that reduces the distinctions between large and small ﬁrms (..)
The independent ﬁrm-based industrial system [Route 128] ﬂourished in an environment of mar-
ket stability and slow-changing technologies (..). In the case of semiconductors and again with
computers, Silicon Valley’s network-based system supported a decentralized process of experimen-
tation and learning that fostered successful adaptation, while Route 128’s ﬁrm-based system was
21that innovation is generated and reinvigorated through the mobility of people and
ideas.29 Under this view, two elements are essential to create innovation. First,
ideas are cumulative in the sense that one idea generates another.30 Second, in
order to exploit the cumulative potential of ideas one needs to match knowledge
with people coming from diﬀerent experiences. These observations suggest that
diﬀerent industries may be characterized by diﬀerent cultures that relate to secrecy
and information diﬀusion. It is our goal to use our framework to gain a better
understanding of the strategic mechanics of these cultures.
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26Appendix
The Model
We now present the bargaining protocol in detail. Let us consider a ﬁnite set of
agents N,w i t h|N| = n>2, among which there are n0 shareholders of an original ﬁrm.
Among the n0 agents in the ﬁrm, there is an innovator, say agent 1, that has an idea for
a business venture. All the agents in N\{1} are initially unaware of the business idea.
If developed, this idea can be implemented into one marketable product. The process
of developing the idea requires the work of m agents. Let n0 be the minimal number of
agents one needs to negotiate with in order to introduce a new product within the ﬁrm.
Let also Σ be the set of the possible majority coalitions within the original ﬁrm. Let S
a generic element in Σ.
The structure of the game builds recursively on two types of negotiation subgames.
What distinguishes the two types of subgames is whether one ﬁrm producing the new
product has already formed or it has not.
Suppose we are at some history along the game at which a ﬁrm has not yet formed
and the set of the informed agents, i.e. the agents who know the new idea, is K0 ⊇ {1}.
We are now ready to introduce the ﬁrst negotiation subgame. We assume that nature
chooses with equal probability among the informed agents in K0 the next agent to make
an oﬀer. The chosen agent, say agent i ∈ K0, can propose a division of the surplus to a
set of agents C0 ⊂ N\{i}. The division of the surplus, α, is a vector α ∈ ∆card(C),w h e r e
∆card(C0) is the simplex in Rcard(C) An oﬀer is fully represented by the pair (C0,α).T h e
agents in C0 have to decide simultaneously whether to reject or to accept the oﬀer. The
crucial assumption in this model is that all of the agents who receive an oﬀer become
informed, and the set of the informed agents becomes C0 ∪ K0. If at least one agent in
C0 rejects the oﬀer, they enter a negotiation subgame in which no ﬁrm has formed. If all
accept, then the ﬁrst ﬁrm is formed, and four resulting cases are possible.
(1) If C0 ⊇ K0\{i} and C0 ⊇ S,with S ∈ Σ, i.e. all the other informed agents are
included in the oﬀer and the oﬀer is an internal disclosure, then the game ends; the ﬁrm
implements the idea and enjoys a monopoly status. Any agent j ∈ C0 receives αj, agent
i receives (1−
P
j∈C0 αj), and agents in N\(C0 ∪ {i}) receive zero. We refer to an oﬀer
such that C0 ⊇ K0\{i} as a “grand coalition” oﬀer.
(2) If C0 + K0\{i} and C0 ⊇ S with S ∈ Σ, not all the informed agents become
part of the ﬁrst ﬁrm, which is still an internal disclosure. The informed agents that are
not part of the ﬁrst ﬁrm can keep on negotiating and form a second ﬁrm. We therefore
enter a second type of negotiation subgame in which one ﬁrm has formed and for which
27the set of informed agents left in the game is K0\(C0 ∪ {i}). In any terminal node
following this history agent i receives (1 −
P
j∈C0 αj)π0
1 and any agent j ∈ C0 receives
αjπ0
1. We refer to an oﬀer such that C0 + K0\{i} as a “cost minimizing” oﬀer.
(3) If C0 ⊇ K0\{i} and C0 # S,for any S ∈ Σ,then the oﬀer is a grand-coalition
“spin-out”. If it is accepted, every agent j ∈ C0 receives αjπ0
2, agent i receives (1 − P
j∈C0 αj)π0
2, and agents in the original ﬁrm split π0
1 according with their original shares.
All the others receive zero.
(4) If C0 # K0\{i} and C0 # S,for any S ∈ Σ,then the oﬀer is a “cost-minimizing
spin-out”. If it is accepted, every agent j ∈ C0 receives αjπ00
2, agent i receives (1 − P
j∈C0 αj)π00
2, and agents in the original ﬁrm split π00
1 according with their original shares.
The informed agents that are not part of the ﬁrst ﬁrm can keep on negotiating and form
as e c o n dﬁrm. We therefore enter a second type of negotiation subgame in which one ﬁrm
has formed and for which the set of informed agents left in the game is K0\(C0 ∪ {i}).
Let us now introduce the second type of negotiation subgame. Such subgames ensue
after some agent i has already formed a ﬁrm making a successful oﬀer to the set of agents
C0.L e t K00 be the set of informed agents left in the game. With equal probability,
an agent h is chosen from K00 to propose a division of the surplus to a set of agents
C00 ⊂ N\(C0 ∪ {i} ∪ {h}).L e tβ ∈ ∆card(C0) be the proposed division. If everybody
accepts the oﬀer, the game ends. After case (2), agent h receives (1 −
P
j∈C00 βj)π0
2,
and any agent j ∈ C00 receives βjπ0
2. All the agents in N\(C0 ∪C00 ∪{i}∪{h}) receive
zero. After case (4), agent h receives (1−
P
j∈C00 βj)π00
3, and any agent j ∈ C00 receives
βjπ00
3. All the agents in N\(C0 ∪C00 ∪{i}∪{h}) receive zero. If someone in C00 rejects
oﬀer β, then the we enter a negotiation subgame in which one ﬁrm has formed and for
which the set of informed agents is K00 ∪ C00.
Note that we use unanimity as the rule that governs the formation of a ﬁrm, so that
the oﬀers are conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents involved. This implies
that agents cannot make an oﬀer that is binding on his side as soon as at least one agent
accepts it (“unconditional oﬀer”).
We assume that there are frictions in bargaining due to impatience. These frictions
are represented by a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). Every time we enter a nego-
tiation subgame, payoﬀs in that subgame are discounted by δ. If no agreement on the
implementation of the new idea is reached, the original ﬁrm keeps on its production
and all the shareholders get their share of the proﬁt π., while all the other agents have
reservation value normalized to zero. We assume all the agents are risk-neutral.
Before we specify the notion of equilibrium we adopt, let us introduce the set of
possible histories of this game, H. The set H can be decomposed into the subsets HO,
HR, HN and HT. The set HO includes all the histories at which an agent is called to
28make an oﬀer, and we denote by hi ag e n e r i ch i s t o r yi nHO at which agent i is called to
make an oﬀer. The set HR includes all the histories at which agents are simultaneously
called to reply to an oﬀer, the set HN includes all the histories at which nature chooses
the next proposer, and the set HT include all the terminal histories. Every history in
HO is followed by a history in HR,a n de v e r yh i s t o r yi nHR is followed either by a
history in HT or by a history in HN.E v e r y h i s t o r y i nHN is followed by a history in
HO. Let K (h) be the set of informed agents in the game at history h ∈ H, and let
k(h) ≡ card(K (h)).
For any player i ∈ N, as t r a t e g ysi is deﬁned for all histories in H at which agent i
takes an action, speciﬁcally for all histories in HO at which he is called to make an oﬀer
and all histories in HR at which he is called to reply.
To analyze this model, we look at Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE).
Among the SSPE, we look at those in which agents do not use weakly dominated actions
when responding to oﬀers.31
To deﬁne Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria, we ﬁrst have to require strategies
to be anonymous. Let σi be a mixed strategy of player i ∈ N.W e s a y t h a t σi is
anonymous if at any history hi ∈ HO,σ i (hi) can be described by a triple
¡
nI,n U,γ
¢
,
where nI and nU are the number of informed and uninformed agents getting the oﬀer,
respectively, and γ is the vector of shares oﬀered to each agent.32 The agents included in
the oﬀer are randomly chosen from among the two groups.33 The vector γ has dimension
nI + nU.T h eﬁrst nI elements, the shares oﬀered to the informed agents, are all equal
to γI and the remaining nU elements, the shares oﬀered to the uninformed agents, are
all equal to γU.34
31This assumption is important only in Subsection 3.1 and Section 4, where situations
in which proposers are forced to make oﬀers to more than one agent become relavant.
We want to rule out equilibria that are sustained by the mere fact that agents are not
pivotal. For example, one can sustain equilibria in which oﬀers to more than one agent
are never accepted by any agent. These strategies could be chosen in equilibrium as,
by our unanimity assumption, no agent is pivotal in the acceptance or rejection of such
oﬀer. By assuming away weakly dominated actions, we guarantee that an agent who
desires the oﬀer to be accepted, votes in its favor.
32This implies that nI ∈ {0,1,..k(hi) − 1}, nU ∈ {0,1,..,n− k(hi)}, and γ is such
that γ ≥ 0 and
P
i γi ≤ 1.
33Then, since at history hi there are card(K (hi)\{i}) informed agents and
card(N\K (hi)) uninformed agents, each informed agent gets the oﬀer with probability
nI
card(K(hi)\{i}) , and each uninformed agent gets the oﬀer with probability nU
card(N\K(hi)).
34More generally, we could allow for any mixture of these strategies. The results would
remain the same under this alternative formulation.
29Deﬁnition 1 A Subgame Perfect equilibrium is Symmetric if σi is anonymous for any
i ∈ N and at any hi,h j ∈ HO following the same history h ∈ N, σi (hi) and σj (hj) can
be described by the same triple
¡
nI,n U,γ
¢
. Moreover, at any h0 ∈ HR, σi (h0) and σj (h0)
are the same for any i and j who are playing at h0.
In the analysis of the model, we compute the continuation values of the players at
histories h ∈ HN, i.e., when nature is about to choose the next proposer and the payoﬀs
are about to be discounted. We denote the continuation value of agent i at a given
history h as vi (h).
A property of the SSPE is that for any h ∈ HN, all the informed agents have the
same continuation value, or vi (h)=vj (h)=v(h) for all i,j ∈ K (h).
30Proofs
Proposition 1 If the original ﬁrm is egalitarian, then there is w such that (i)
if w>w, then the innovator does not disclose his idea at all, (ii) if w<w then
the innovator will leave the ﬁrm and form a spin-out if the size of the original ﬁrm
is high enough, otherwise he reveals the idea within the ﬁrm.
Proof: Let us ﬁrst show that if the innovator decides to reveal his idea within the ﬁrm
his payoﬀ is 1
n+1. To show this, it is necessary to see that within the ﬁrm the innovator
will reveal his idea to all n shareholders, even if he needs to get the approval only from
n0 of them. Observe that if he stays in the ﬁrm and discloses the idea to s shareholders,
by Lemma 1, he gets s
n
1
s+1, which is increasing in s. This implies that the optimal s is
s = n,a n dt h eﬁnal share of the innovator is 1
n+1.
If the innovator stays silent his payoﬀ is w.I f h e l e a v e s t h e ﬁrm, by Lemma 1, he
gets π2
m+1.
If w<max{ 1
n+1, π2
m+1} ≡ w then the innovator leaves if and only if
π2
m +1
>
1
n +1
and discloses the idea within the ﬁrm otherwise. If w>w then the employee stays
silent¥
Proposition 2 If the original ﬁrm is dictatorial, then there is w such that
if w<w, the innovator discloses the idea within the ﬁrm and if w>w,t h e n
the innovator does not disclose his idea anywhere. Therefore, spin-out ﬁrms never
arise in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that the inspired employee is introducing the idea within the ﬁrm.
The owner can always guarantee himself π1. Therefore, in the ensuing negotiation he
gets max
©
π1, 1
m+1
ª
.35 Suppose that π1 > 1
m+1. Then, the innovator has to compare
1−π1
m to π2
m. Remember that π1+π2 ≤ 1. Then, if w<w = 1−π1
m , the innovator discloses
the idea within the ﬁrm as 1−π1
m > π2
m. Suppose that π1 < 1
m+1. Then, if w<w = 1
m+1,
the innovator has to compare 1
m+1 to π2
m+1, and obviously he discloses the idea within
the ﬁrm¥
Proposition 3 In an egalitarian ﬁrm, whenever an internal disclosure is ex-
pected, there is no buying-oﬀ. If a spin-out is expected, buying-oﬀ will take place if
π2
m+1 is relatively small, otherwise a spin-out forms in equilibrium.
35The continuation game is similar to a Rubinstein bargaining game with a binding
outside option for the owner.
31Proof: (i) From Proposition 1 we know that, if the employee decides to disclose his
idea internally his payoﬀ is 1
n+1, if he forms a spin-out he gets
π2
m+1, w h i l ei fh es t a y s
silent he gets w. From the point of view of the shareholders, we have two possible cases.
(ia) If 1
n+1 > π2
m+1, we know that if w< 1
n+1, then the employee will disclose the idea
internally. From the point of view of the shareholders, we have the if they decide not to
b u yt h ee m p l o y e eo ﬀ,t h e yw i l lg e t 1
n+1, while of they decide to silence him, they have
to set w = 1
n+1, and they get π−w
n =
π− 1
n+1
n . The shareholders will silence the employee
i fa n do n l yi f
π− 1
n+1
n > 1
n+1, or π − 1
n+1 > n
n+1, or π>1, which is impossible.
(ib) If 1
n+1 <
π2
m+1, we know that if w<
π2
m+1, then the employee will leave and form
a spin-out. If the shareholders set w = π2
m+1, they prevent this to happen, and they get
π−w
n =
π−
π2
m+1
n , otherwise they get π1
n . Then, the buying oﬀ of the employee occurs if
a n do n l yi f
π−
π2
m+1
n > π1
n ,o rπ − π2
m+1 >π 1.
Proposition 4 In a dictatorial ﬁrm, in which internal disclosure is always
expected, buying-oﬀ will occur when the idea is relatively labor intensive.
Proof: From Proposition 2 we know that the owner of a “dictatorial” ﬁrm, in case
of an internal disclosure gets max
©
π1, 1
m+1
ª
, and the innovator never forms a spin-out.
(iia) Suppose that π1 > 1
m+1. T h e n ,i fh es e t sw = 1−π1
m , the owner of the ﬁrm gets
π − w = π − 1−π1
m . If he sets w =0 , there will be a renegotiation where he will get π1.
Then, the buying oﬀ o c c u r si fa n do n l yi fπ− 1−π1
m >π 1, or πm−1 >m π 1−π. Notice
that if π<π 1 there is never buying oﬀ,w h i l ei fπ>π 1, then for m high enough the
owner will buy oﬀ the innovator.
(iib) Suppose that π1 < 1
m+1. Then, if w = 1
m+1, the owner of the ﬁrm gets π−w =
π − 1
m+1, while if he sets w =0he gets 1
m+1. Then, there is buying oﬀ i fa n do n l yi f
π> 2
m+1¥
Proposition 5 (i) In both types of ﬁrms, hiring becomes more attractive as the
new idea is more labor intensive, i.e. m is large, and the higher is the marginal
productivity of the employee (ii) In an “egalitarian" ﬁrm, hiring decisions depend
negatively on the employee’s outside option, π2 (iii) In a “dictatorial" ﬁrm, hiring
decisions depend positively on the outside option of the ﬁrm, π1 (whereas they do
not depend on π2).
Proof: (i) is obvious. (ii) If an egalitarian ﬁrm decides not to hire an employee then
every shareholder gets
π
n (1 + δ).
If the ﬁrm hires, then from Proposition 3, we have two cases.
32(iia) Suppose ﬁrst that 1
n+1 < π2
m. Then, the employee is expected to leave the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm decides to buying him oﬀ i fa n do n l yi f
π−
π2
m
n > π1
n ,o rπ − π2
m >π 1. Then, we
have that hiring will take place if and only if max{π
n + δπ1
n , π
n + δ
π−
π2
m
n } >
π
n + δ
π
n, or
max{π1,π− π2
m} >
π(1+δ)−π
δ .
(iib) Suppose now that 1
n+1 >
π2
m. Then, the employee is expected to disclose the
idea internally and, from Proposition 3, we know that there is no buying-oﬀ.F r o m
hiring the employees, the shareholders get π
n +δ 1
n+1, so they will hire him if and only if
π
n + δ
π
n < π
n + δ 1
n+1, or δ(
π
n − 1
n+1) <
(π−π)
n , w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed.
(iii) If the owner of a dictatorial ﬁrm doesn’t hire, he gets π(1 + δ). If he hires, we
know from Proposition 2 that there cannot be a spin-out. Then, if π1 > 1
m+1, he buys
the employee oﬀ i fa n do n l yi fπ − 1−π1
m >π 1 (the payoﬀs in the second period in the
two cases). Comparing the payoﬀ from hiring to the payoﬀ from not hiring, we get that
the owner should hire if and only if
max{π + δ
µ
π −
1 − π1
m
¶
,π+ δπ1} >π (1 + δ)
or, equivalently,
max{π−
1 − π1
m
,π 1} >
π(1 + δ) − π
δ
The case π1 < 1
m+1 is very similar to the case we just analyzed. This concludes the
proof¥
Proposition 6: In both types of ﬁrms, the optimal information provision
schemes are of one of the following forms: (i) Both agents are fully informed and
bought oﬀ. (ii) One agent is fully informed and bought oﬀ while the other receives
minimum compensation and is informed to some level. (iii) Both agents receive
minimum compensation and are informed to some level.
Proof: F i r s tw ee x a m i n et h ec a s eo fa n“ e g a l i t a r i a n "ﬁrm. Suppose, that only one
employee is inspired with a new idea. If he discloses the idea internally, we know by
Proposition 3 that there is no buying-oﬀ, so the optimal information provision scheme
is as in (iii). If he leaves the ﬁrm, buying him oﬀ will cost π2
m+1. If two employees are
inspired, to buy each of them oﬀ,t h eﬁrm must guarantee that employee π2
m+1.
There are three possible courses of action for the shareholders of the original ﬁrm:
(a) Buy only one employee, say 1, oﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s shareholders
33problem is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2
π(x1,x 2) − δ π2
m+1
n
+ δ(1 − α(x2))
π(x1,x 2)
n
+ δα(x2)
π1
n
(1)
(b) Buy both employees oﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s shareholders problem is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2
π(x1,x 2)(1+δ) − 2δ π2
m+1
n
(2)
(c) Buy no agent oﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s shareholders problem is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2
π(x1,x 2)
n
[1 + δ(1 − α(x1))(1 − α(x2))]+δ[1 − (1 − α(x1))(1 − α(x2))]
π1
n
(3)
It is apparent that if one buys an employee oﬀ,i ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt og i v et h e m
the entire information. This is evident as the objective functions of problems (1), (2)
and (3) are always increasing in the level of information provided to the agent who is
bought oﬀ. Then, letting (x∗
1,x ∗
2) be the optimal solution of (1), and (x∗∗
1 ,x ∗∗
2 ) be the
optimal solution of (3), we can rewrite the objective functions at the optimum solution
respectively as:
π(1,x ∗
2) − δ π2
m+1
n
+δ(1 − α(x
∗
2))
π(1,x ∗
2)
n
+δα(x
∗
2)
π1
n
π(1,1)(1 + δ) − 2δ
π2
m+1
n
and
π(x∗∗
1 ,x ∗∗
2 )
n
[1 + δ(1 − α(x
∗∗
1 ))(1 − α(x
∗∗
2 ))]+δ[1 − (1 − α(x
∗∗
1 ))(1 − α(x
∗∗
2 ))]
π1
n
Note that the buying oﬀ an additional employee involves a trade-oﬀ between a discrete
jump in the compensation paid to the employee,
π2
m+1, and a beneﬁt that is related to a
decrease in the probability of defection and in the productivity in production. Notice that
if m is very large, the ﬁrm will buy oﬀ both agents as buying oﬀ is relatively inexpensive.
If m is intermediate the ﬁrm will buy oﬀ one employee. If m is small the ﬁrm will not
buy oﬀ any employee.
We now examine the case of a “dictatorial" ﬁrm. Suppose, that only one employee
is inspired with a new idea. If w<w, from Proposition 2, we know that he will choose
34to disclose the idea internally, and the owner of the ﬁrm will get φ ≡ max
©
π1, 1
m+1
ª
.
Suppose the owner buys the employee oﬀ,i . e .w = w (from Proposition 4, w is either
1
m+1 or 1−π1
m to the ﬁrm, depending whether π1 is smaller or greater than 1
m+1). If two
employees are inspired, to buy each of them oﬀ,t h eﬁrm must guarantee that employee
w.
T h ef o l l o w i n ga r et h et h r e ep o s s i b l ec ourses of action for the owner of the ﬁrm:
(a) Buy only one employee, say 1,o ﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s owner problem
is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2 π(x1,x 2) − δw + δ(1 − α(x2))π(x1,x 2)+δα(x2)φ (4)
(b) Buy both employees oﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s owner problem is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2 π(x1,x 2)(1+δ) − 2δw (5)
(c) Buy no agent oﬀ. In this case, the original ﬁrm’s owner problem is
max
(x1,x2)∈[0,1]2 π(x1,x 2)[1+δ(1 − α(x1)(1 − α(x2))] + [1 − (1 − α(x1)(1 − α(x2))]φ
(6)
Observe that, as in the egalitarian ﬁrm case, if the owner buys an employee oﬀ,i t
is optimal to give them the entire information(again, the objective functions of (4), (5),
(6) are always increasing in the level of information provided to the agent who is bought
oﬀ.
Then, letting (x∗
1,x ∗
2) be the optimal solution of (4), and (x∗∗
1 ,x ∗∗
2 ) be the optimal so-
lution of (6), we can rewrite the objective functions at the optimum solution respectively
as:
π(1,x ∗
2)
n
−δw+δ(1 − α(x
∗
2))π(1,x
∗
2)+δα(x
∗
2)φ
π(1,1)−2δw+δπ(1,1)
and
π(x
∗∗
1 ,x
∗∗
2 )[1+δ(1 − α(x
∗∗
2 ))(1 − α(x
∗∗
2 ))]+(1 − (1 − α(x
∗∗
1 ))(1 − α(x
∗∗
2 )))φ
Again, buying oﬀ an additional employee involves a trade-oﬀ between a discrete jump
in compensation paid to the employee, w (notice that w is always inversely related to
m) and a beneﬁt that is related to a decrease in the probability of defection and in
35productivity of production. If m is very large, the ﬁrm will buy oﬀ both agents as
buying oﬀ is relatively cheap. If m is intermediate the ﬁrm will buy oﬀ one employee. If
m is small the ﬁrm will not buy oﬀ any employee¥
Proposition 7: There is an equilibrium such that for some ¯ t ≥ 0,i faﬁrm ex-
isted for less than or for exactly ¯ t periods, new ideas are always disclosed internally
and introduced on the market within the ﬁrm. After ¯ t periods, the next innovation
is introduced forming a spin-out, and a new ﬁrm starts its growth. If γδ
0 < 1,
there exist parameters for which ¯ t ≥ 1.
Proof : In the proposed equilibrium, at time t =0the innovator makes an oﬀer to
m agents, oﬀering 1
m+1 to each of them. An egalitarian ﬁrm is then formed, and the
number of people in this ﬁrm is n = m +1 . The wage that is paid to employee in any
period, is equal to zero. At period in which the age of the ﬁrm is t<¯ t, the inspired
agent faces the following choice: if he discloses the idea internally, the ﬁrm grows by
one person, and the employee gets his share of the proﬁts as long as the ﬁrm will keep
on making proﬁts. If he leaves to form a spin-out, it will face competition from the old
ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period, but then it will start a new life cycle. Therefore, the equilibrium
stratgies are stationary with respect to the state variable, which is the age of the ﬁrm.
First step:I f
γ
m +2
+
δ
0γ2π1
m +2
≤
γπ2
m +1
+
δ
0γ2
m +2
+
(δ
0)
2 γ3π1
m +2
(7)
Then let ¯ t ≡ 0 and the above proposed strategies form an equilibrium.
Second step: If condition (7) is not satisﬁed, we have to ﬁnd a ¯ t ≥ 1 such that if
the ﬁrm has been existing for less or exactly ¯ t periods the idea is introduced internally,
while if the ﬁrm has existed for ¯ t+1periods a spin-out forms. In any ﬁrst period of the
existence of a ﬁrm, the employees discloses the idea internally if and only if
1
m +2
+
δ
0γ
m +3
+..+
(δ
0)
¯ t−1 γ
¯ t−t
m + ¯ t +1
+
(δ
0)
¯ t γ
¯ t−t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
≥
π2
m +1
+
δ
0γ
m +2
+..+
(δ
0)
¯ t+1 γ
¯ t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
More in general, at any period t ≤ ¯ t of the existence of a ﬁrm,w eh a v et h a tt h e
innovator discloses the idea internally if and only if
1
m + t +1
+
δ
0γ
m + t +2
+ .. +
(δ
0)
¯ t−t−1 γ
¯ t
m + ¯ t +1
+
(δ
0)
¯ t−t γ
¯ t−t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
(8)
≥
π2
m +1
+
δ
0γ
m +2
+ .. +
(δ
0)
¯ t γ
¯ t+1
m + ¯ t +1
+
(δ
0)
¯ t+1 γ
¯ t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
36Notice that for any ¯ t the LHS of condition (8) decreases in t while the RHS does not
depend on t. So, the date at which it is the hardest to sustain internal disclosure is at ¯ t.
At that date, we have
1
m + ¯ t +1
+
δ
0γπ1
m + ¯ t +1
(9)
≥
π2
m +1
+
δ
0γ
m +2
+ .. +
(δ
0)
¯ t+1 γ
¯ t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
If (9) is satisﬁed, then (8) is satisﬁed for any t ≤ ¯ t.
To sustain this equilibrium it must be the case that at ¯ t+1the innovator prefers to
form a spin-out, that is
1
m + ¯ t +2
+
δ
0γπ1
m + ¯ t +2
(10)
<
π2
m +1
+
δ
0γ
m +2
+ .. +
(δ
0)
¯ t+1 γ
¯ t+1π1
m + ¯ t +1
Thus, the equilibrium age of the ﬁrm, ¯ t, must be the smallest integer such that
conditions (9) and (10) are both satisﬁed. Such a solution must exist as by (7) that (9)
is satisﬁed for ¯ t =1 , and the LHS decreases andt h eR H Si n c r e a s e si n¯ t¥
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